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Abstract 
This paper uses the theoretical framework of the theory of tax reform to analyse whether 
a  "small" change in an existing food subsidy program can be welfare-improving and 
revenue-neutral. It shows how existing econometric methods can be adapted to estimate 
demand parameters even when household level data exhibit little price variation because 
the government controls food prices. The methodology developed here is used to estimate 
welfare changes from shifting a rupee of subsidy on existing commodities to coarse 
cereals in the Indian public distribution system. 
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  1 Reforming Food Subsidy Schemes in India: 
Estimating the Gains from Self-Targeting 
 
1.   Introduction 
Many countries implement safety nets and anti-poverty programs whose purpose is 
to provide benefits specifically for the poor.  However, it is not an easy task to identify 
the poor.  This makes it very difficult to design schemes under which the non-target 
groups can be excluded from deriving these benefits (Besley and Kanbur, 1993, Lipton 
and Ravallion, 1995, van de Walle, 1998).   The failure to design properly targeted 
schemes whose benefits accrue only to the target group obviously inflates the overall 
costs of most safety net programs.  
The errors arising due to the failures of targeting make self-targeted programs, in 
which the relatively rich voluntarily opt out of the program, particularly valuable.
1 Self-
targeting in food subsidies can work by subsidizing commodities consumed primarily by 
the poor.  Several countries have experimented with self-targeted food subsidies. For 
instance, sorghum flour was substituted for wheat in the food subsidy program in 
Bangladesh.  Self-targeting can also be achieved by quality differentiation. This 
experiment has been carried out in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco.
2    
Despite the widespread use of food subsidy programs in different countries, there 
have been few formal quantitative analyses of these programs.  In particular, how do we 
determine whether the right basket of commodities is being subsidised? Or how do we 
determine the impact on social welfare of a change in the existing rates of subsidy?   
                                                            
1 Programs can suffer from  Type 1 and Type 2 targeting errors (Cornia and Stewart, 1993; Hoddinot, 
1999).  Type 2 errors occur when members of the target group are excluded from the program. The focus of 
this paper is on Type 1 errors that occur when non-target groups are included  in the program. 
2 For a survey of issues and experiences, see Alderman and Lindert, 1998. 
  2 This is the main focus of our paper. We use the theoretical framework of the 
theory of tax reform to analyze whether a  "small" change from an existing food subsidy 
program can be welfare-improving and revenue-neutral.  In principle, the contemplated 
change could be in the rates of subsidy of the existing basket of goods.  Alternatively, it 
could be the introduction of a new commodity into the basket of subsidised goods.   
  This exercise will typically involve the estimation of the specific structure of 
demand. This is because budget share data alone cannot tell us fully about the 
consequences of self-targeting since the policy experiment will decrease the price of 
coarse cereals relative to the prices of rice and wheat.  The usual substitution effect can 
be expected to lead to a shift in consumption in favour of coarse cereals.  The magnitude 
of the shift will depend on the specific structure of demand, and must therefore be 
estimated. 
Consider situations where the government already has in place a subsidised food 
delivery system. Then, there may be very little variation in food prices in the household 
level cross-section data set since the government controls these prices.  As a result, the 
information is insufficient to estimate all the demand parameters (and hence the welfare 
change) using “standard” procedures such as those used by Deaton (1997).  However, we 
show Deaton’s procedure can be modified by  (a) reducing the number of demand 
parameters by considering policy experiments that do not alter the relative prices between 
the subsidised commodities and by (b) using the homogeneity restriction of demand 
theory to identify the other “troublesome” parameters. 
  We place our theoretical analysis in the context of an evaluation of the welfare gains 
from self-targeting food subsidies in India, which are provided through a state controlled 
  3 marketing network known as the public distribution system (PDS).  The PDS has been 
the most prominent element of India’s safety net system, and handles about 40 per cent of 
the total quantities of rice and wheat transacted on the market.  The PDS costs over 0.5 
percent of the country’s GDP and about 6 per cent of the Central Government’s tax 
revenues.  The system has been criticised because of the absence of targeting and hence 
the inordinately high cost of delivering benefits to the target group.
3  The potential for 
improvement makes the empirical analysis particularly relevant and important. 
Rice and wheat are the main commodities that are subsidised under the PDS. On 
the other hand, coarse cereals comprising sorghum, pearl millet and maize are known to 
receive higher shares in the household budgets of the poor in several regions of the 
country.  But these commodities are unsubsidized.  This paper asks whether it would be 
welfare improving to transfer one rupee of subsidy from rice and wheat to the coarse 
cereals.   
Since the importance of coarse cereals varies by state and residence, our empirical 
analysis is disaggregated by state and region.  For reasons that are discussed later, the 
gains from self-targeting might be expected to differ sharply between Andhra Pradesh 
and Maharashtra.  We therefore choose these two states for a formal analysis of the gains 
from transferring a subsidy rupee from wheat and rice to coarse cereals.  
The plan of the paper is the following.  The next section sets out a theoretical 
framework.  Section 3 provides some descriptive statistics related to the operation of the 
PDS in the two states.  Section 4 contains the estimation procedure and results.  We 
conclude in Section 5. 
                                                            
3 For instance,  Ahluwalia (1993), Dev and Suryanarayana (1991), Howes and Jha (1992) and Parikh 
(1994). 
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2.  Theoretical Framework 
The theory of tax reform seeks to find out whether "small" departures from the 
status quo can be welfare improvements - that is whether the current situation is a "local" 
optimum (Newbery and Stern, 1987; Deaton, 1997).  The policy reform with which we 
are concerned falls under this theory since we are interested in estimating the welfare 
consequences of marginal changes in prices. 
The first step in any tax reform exercise is a specification of a social welfare 
function, which provides a ranking of alternative social states.  It is customary to assume 
that social welfare is a function of individual utilities.  As our data set collects 
information about households, we shall assume that each individual within a household 
receives the same utility and neglect the intra-household distribution of utilities.  So, if 
there are n households, then the social welfare function in its general form can be written 
as  
(1)     W    ) ,..... , ( 2 1 n u u u V =
While (1) is the general form of an individualistic social welfare function, we use 
a more specific functional form due to Atkinson (1970).  When extended to households, 
the Atkinson social welfare function takes the form (Deaton, 1997), 


























Here, xh is household h's income (or expenditure), H is the number of households, nh is 
the number of persons in household h and ε measures the degree of inequality aversion in 
society.  A higher value of ε  represents a greater aversion for inequality.  Note that if ε = 
  5 0, then society has no aversion to inequality.  In other words, social welfare is a simple or 
unweighted average of individual utilities. 
  The individual utilities can be obtained as the values of indirect utility functions 
of different households.  Thus, the utility level of household h can be represented as  
( 3 )       u   ) , ( p x g h h =
where p is the price vector.  The derivative of social welfare with respect to a change in 
the price of good i is given by  












p W / 
Let ηh be the social marginal utility of money in the hands of household h, i.e,  
) / )( / ( h h h h x u u V ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ = η .  Using Roy’s identity, (4) can be rewritten as  
(5)      ∑ − = ∂ ∂
h
ih h i q p W η / 
  We consider a model in which there are five commodities - rice and wheat 
supplied through the PDS, denoted as commodities 1 and 2 respectively, coarse cereals 
denoted as commodity 3, and rice and wheat sold in the open market which are 
commodities 4 and 5 respectively.
4  The rice and wheat supplied through the PDS are 
sold at prices fixed by the government while the market determines the prices of the other 
commodities.  Suppose now that the government increases the price of commodities 1 
and 2 and uses the proceeds to subsidise the market sales of commodity 3 (coarse 
cereals).  What happens to welfare?  This is our question.   
Let ci be the cost of supplying one unit of commodity i through the public 
distribution system.  Households buy the commodity at price pi .  Denote ri to be the rate 
  6 of subsidy on good i.  Hence  .  Consider now a policy reform that 
decreases the subsidy rate to commodity 1 and increases the subsidy rate to commodity 3 
such that (i) relative prices between 1 and 2 are held constant and (ii) the total subsidy 
bill is held constant.  The second condition guarantees revenue neutrality.  As regards the 
first condition, note that constancy of relative prices implies that subsidy rate on 
commodity 2 decreases as well.  Thus the policy reform is a shift of the subsidy rupee 
from commodities 1 and 2 to commodity 3. We impose condition (i) because it eliminates 
from the demand responses, the effect of a change in commodity 1 price on the demand 
for commodity 2 and vice-versa.  We discuss later why such effects are impossible to 
estimate from our data set.   
i i i c r p ) 1 ( − =
Using (5), the change in welfare following from the policy experiment is 




h h q dr dr r p q dr dp W 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 ) / )( / ( ) / ( η η
∑ −
h
h hq dr dr dr dp 3 1 3 3 3 ) / )( / ( η
  
   
We calculate  from the condition that the ratio( is constant.  This yields 
.  Also let w
1 2 / dr dr
1 ( ) 1
1 r − −
) / 1 2 p p
) 1 ( / 2 1 2 r dr dr − = ih= (piqih/xh) denote the share of good i in the 
budget of household h. Then, for commodity i,  
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
− − = − = = − h ih h i ih i h i
h
i ih h ih h i i x w r q p r c q q dr dp η η η η 1 ) 1 ( )) 1 /( 1 ( ) / ( 
Define  .   is the average of η  (weighted by household 





ih h i x x w w / η ε ε
i w ih hw
                                                                                                                                                                             
4 Coarse cereals are not part of the food subsidy system and therefore not supplied through the PDS. 
  7 reason, Deaton calls   the “socially representative budget share”.  Denoting the per 
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In the Atkinson welfare function, the welfare weights are η .  The socially 
representative budget share therefore becomes  .  
Notice that when ε = 0,   is the average budget share (weighted by household income) 
of the ith commodity.  In the general case when ε ,  depends on ε  and the 
distribution of income.   
ε − = ) / ( h h h n x
−







i x w ( ε
0 ≠ w
Using the above expression and substituting for  , the change in welfare 
due to a change in subsidy rate on good 1 is  
1 2 / dr dr























The first two terms within the square brackets represent the loss in social welfare 
because of the decrease in subsidy on rice and wheat.  This depends on the commodity 
budget shares of wheat and rice and the distribution of welfare weights parameterized by 
ε.  Greater are the proportions of PDS rice and wheat in household budgets, greater are 
the welfare losses.  The third term is the gain to social welfare from the subsidy to coarse 
cereals.  For any individual household, greater is the consumption of coarse cereals, 
greater is that household’s net gain from the policy reform.  If, relative to the rich, poor 
households consume little of PDS rice and wheat but more of coarse cereals, the policy 
measure would favour the poor and be adverse for the rich.  For these consumption 
  8 patterns, greater is the inequality aversion incorporated in the social welfare function, 
greater is the likelihood that the policy reform leads to an increase is welfare.  
Besides consumption patterns and welfare weights, there is another factor as well.  
The magnitude of gains also depends on the extent to which coarse cereals are subsidised 
(i.e.,  which in turn depends on the increase in government revenues when 
subsidies to PDS wheat and rice are reduced.  Here demand responses matter and must 
therefore be estimated.   Following Deaton, we choose standard demand models where 
budget share is a linear function of the logarithms of total expenditure and prices, i.e., for 
the kth commodity  
)) / 1 3 dr dr
(8)                                   w   ∑ + + =
i
k ki k k k p x a ln ln θ β
Given (8), we calculate   from the condition that the total subsidy is 
constant.  Denote  , so that S
1 3 / dr dr
− ih i q p )
−
i i i p r r 1 )
∑ =
h
i i c S (
∑ − =
h
i S 1 (
i  is the total subsidy on good i.  This can 
also be written as  .  The total subsidy is  ∑
− − =
h
h ih i i ih x w r r q 1 ) 1 (
(9)     ∑∑
− − =
ih
h ih i i x w r r S 1 ) 1 ( 
The change in subsidy due to the policy reform is therefore given by  

























Putting  , we get  0 = ∆S






































dr dr  
  9 Since coarse cereals are not subsidised,  r3 =0.  In the numerator of (11), the third term is  
) / )( / ( / 1 2 2 3 1 3 dr dr r S r S ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂
( ) 1 ( / 3
1
3 1 3 w x r r r S
h
h ∂ − = ∂ ∂ ∑
−
.  This vanishes at r3 =0 since 
 and ∂ .  
Denote the first two terms of the numerator of (11) as ∆  and  respectively.  Then  
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From budget share equation (8),  






























Using (12) and substituting for (dr2/dr1),  
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= ∆ .  By similar reasoning, this 
can be shown to be  
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We now turn to the denominator of (11).  Call it D 
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Using (12) and evaluating at r3 = 0, the expression simplifies to  
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1
2 2 3 13
1
1 1 3 w s s w s s x Hw D θ θ − − − − − − =
Substituting (13), (14) and (15), we can evaluate   in (11) and hence the welfare 
gain in (7).  Computation of (13), (14) and (15) requires knowledge of the parameters of 
the demand system.  
1 3 / dr dr
 
3.  The PDS in Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra 
As mentioned earlier, our empirical analysis is restricted to the two states of 
Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra.  The data comes from national sample surveys (NSS) 
of consumption expenditures of households during the period June 1993 to May 1994. 
The NSS uses a stratified two-stage sampling design, first sampling clusters (which are 
villages in rural areas and urban blocks in urban areas) and then selecting 10 households 
within each cluster.   The survey elicits consumption expenditures for the household for 
the month preceding the date of survey.  The date of survey varies between the clusters as 
the survey is done at four different times (corresponding to quarters) within the 12 
months from June to May.   
The survey reveals differences in the operation of the public distribution system as 
well as the pattern of consumption between the two states.  Perhaps the most crucial 
  11 difference is that the PDS in Andhra Pradesh has a distinctly superior coverage compared 
to Maharashtra.  About 63 per cent of households in Andhra Pradesh are beneficiaries of 
the public distribution system; the overwhelming majority of them buy rice.  The 
corresponding figure is 38 per cent in Maharashtra.  In Maharashtra, the PDS retails 
wheat and rice.  Coarse cereals are not distributed through the PDS in either state and 
household purchases are entirely from the market.   
A reason why so few households use the PDS in Maharashtra is because the 
geographical coverage of PDS in this state is much lower relative to Andhra Pradesh.  
The NSS survey does not give information on whether the household that did not buy 
PDS grain was because of choice or because a PDS sales outlet was not available in their 
area.  However, this can be deduced because of the two-stage sampling design of the 
survey.  It seems reasonable to assume that if at least one household in the cluster 
purchases PDS grain, then a PDS outlet is available to all housholds in that cluster.  
Defined this way we find that the geographical coverage of the PDS in AP is almost 
universal.  Nearly 98% of clusters have access to PDS.  In Maharashtra, the 
corresponding figure is 71%.   
Controlling for access, 64% of households buy subsidised grain in Andhra Pradesh 
while 50% do so in Maharashtra.  Figure 1 displays, by decile group, the proportion of 
rural households with access to the PDS that buy subsidised grain in the two states.  
Notice that rural Andhra Pradesh does much better than rural Maharashtra in terms of 
lower errors of exclusion while the errors of inclusion are comparable between the two 
states.  The participation rate in AP is about 84% in the bottom decile group, which drops 
to 40% in the top decile.  In Maharashtra, the participation rates at the two ends of the 
  12 income distribution are 57% and 39%.  As a result, the Andhra Pradesh usage curve starts 
well above that of Maharashtra but falls and approaches the Maharashtra curve at higher 
income levels.  This also describes the usage of PDS by urban households in the two 
states (Figure 2).  In both states, therefore, significant numbers of nonpoor receive food 
subsidies.  Could the food subsidy system be redesigned to achieve better targeting? 
As mentioned earlier, coarse cereals (consisting of pearl millet, sorghum and 
maize) consumption is not subsidised.  However, it is well known that the poor consume 
more of this commodity than the nonpoor.  Table 1 shows the average consumption (per 
month and per capita) of coarse cereals in rural and urban sectors of the two states for the 
poorest 40%, middle 30% and the richest 30% of the population.  A subsidy on coarse 
cereals could therefore be self-targeting.    
Tables 2 and 3 display budget shares of the subsidised commodities and of coarse 
cereals by decile groups and by urban and rural residence.   The figures for Andhra 
Pradesh exclude budget shares of wheat since they are negligible for all decile groups.  
We see that, excepting for the bottom 20% in rural areas, coarse cereals are largely 
unimportant in household budgets of all other decile groups in AP.  On the other hand, 
especially for the bottom 5 deciles, subsidised rice accounts for anywhere between 3% to 
8% of household budgets.  The picture is just the opposite in Maharashtra.  In the bottom 
5 rural deciles and the bottom urban decile, household expenditures on coarse cereals are 
many times greater than on subsidised rice and wheat.   In the other decile groups, 
expenditures are comparable between the two sets of commodities.   
Recall that the policy reform consists of increasing the prices of subsidised rice 
and wheat, while decreasing the price of coarse cereals.  As noted earlier in the 
  13 interpretation of (7), households which consume more of coarse cereals relative to the 
subsidised commodities will gain more than households with an opposite consumption 
pattern.  This suggests that the policy reform is more likely to result in a welfare 
improvement in Maharashtra than in Andhra Pradesh.  Note than in Andhra Pradesh, it is 
not even clear that poor households will gain relative to richer households.  This is 
because although poor households have higher budget shares of coarse cereals, they also 
spend higher proportions of their budget on subsidised rice.   
 
4.  Measuring Demand Responses 
  As mentioned earlier, we represent demand behaviour for commodity k by the 
following budget share equation.   
(16)        ∑ + + =
i
k ki k k k p x a w ln ln
0 0 θ β
(16) follows the functional form of the almost ideal demand system of Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980).   
There are two sources of variation in the price data.  The two-stage sampling 
design implies some price variation between clusters.  Second, because of the division of 
the survey into four quarters, prices also vary across time.  Deaton (1997) showed that 
spatial and seasonal price variation can be considerable in developing countries and are 
therefore a useful source for estimating demand parameters.  While this is generally true 
of market goods, it is not so for the subsidised commodities which are sold by the 
government at a fixed price in all regions and all through the year.  On the other hand, 
demand responses to changes in the prices of the subsidised commodities are critical in 
evaluating the welfare impact of policy reform.  Consider equation (13), which is the 
  14 change in subsidy on rice because of lower subsidy rates on rice and wheat.  To evaluate 
it, we need to know the sum θ+ .  This quantity cannot be identified from available 
data since the prices of commodity 1 and commodity 2 show very little variation across 
space or time.  To achieve identification, we use the homogeneity restriction from 
demand theory.  Since a doubling of prices and incomes should leave budget shares 
unchanged we have for commodity k 
12 11 θ
(17)       ∑ = +
l
k kl 0 β θ
From (17), we have θ+ =  .  Similarly, to evaluate (14), the change in 
wheat subsidy we need the sum θ+ , which cannot be estimated directly.  Using the 
homogeneity restriction, we identify this quantity by  .  In order to make the 
homogeneity restriction identify the parameters of interest, we considered the policy 
reform to be of the form where subsidies on wheat and rice are reduced such that their 
relative prices are constant.  If the policy reform did not hold relative prices constant, the 
homogeneity restriction would not identify the parameters of interest.  The demand 
parameters in equation (15) do not involve responses to price changes in commodity 1 
and 2 and can therefore be estimated by the price variation in the data.   















  In estimating (16), we do not use ordinary least squares because of measurement 
error concerns.  The problem has to do with the price variables.  The consumption survey 
does not ask households about the prices that they paid.  Rather, the sampled households 
report both the physical amounts bought as well the expenditures on each good. The ratio 
of these is the unit value, and is used here as the price of the good.  Therefore, any error 
in measuring quantity will involve an error in the corresponding unit value.   For 
  15 instance, if a household has imperfect recall, and underestimates the quantity of rice 
bought, but reports expenditure correctly, then the unit value or price will be 
overestimated and the measurement errors in prices and quantities will be negatively 
correlated.   
The empirical counterpart to (16) is specified as  
(18)     ∑ + + + + + =
i
khc kc kc ki hc k hc k k khc f p z x a w ) ( ln ln ε θ γ β
where the subscripts index commodity k, household h and cluster c.  Here zhc is household 
size, fkc is a cluster fixed effect to account for tastes specific to the cluster and εkhc is a 
random error term.  Even though prices are not observed, it is reasonable to assume that 
all households within a cluster face the same prices.  Hence household does not index the 
price variables.  We observe unit values, which are related to prices by the following: 
(19)       khc kc khc p v η + = ln ln
where v is unit value and η is a random error representing the measurement error if unit 
values are used instead of unobserved prices.  If (19) is substituted in (18), consistent 
estimation would call for instrument variables estimators.  Instead, we follow Deaton’s 
methodology, which involves correcting the ordinary least squares estimators for 
measurement errors.   As the details are available in his work, we provide just a sketch of 
the principal ideas.   
  Deaton’s method is best illustrated for the case when θ  for all  .  Also, 
suppose for the moment, that β
0 = ki k i ≠
k and γ are known.  Then form 
.  Substituting in (18), we get after using (19),  
k
hc k hc k khc khc z x w y γ β− − ≡ ln
) ( ln khc kk khc kc khc kk k khc f v a y η θ ε θ− + + + =  
  16 Averaging across all households within a cluster, we get  
(20)   ) ( ln kc kk kc kc kc kk k kc f v a y η θ ε θ− + + + =  
where the cluster averages have a bar on top of them and are no longer indexed by h.  
(20) is a regression of average cluster demand (purged of income and household size 
effects) on average cluster unit value.  Let δ  be the ordinary least squares estimate of the 
slope coefficient in (20).  From standard results about the consistency of ordinary least 
squares estimators, it can be shown 
(21)   plim(δ)
) (ln
) , ( ) (
kc
kc kc kc kk
kk
v Var
Cov Var η ε η θ
θ
+
− =  
A consistent estimator can therefore be constructed as  
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where the hatted parameters denote consistent estimators of the respective population 
parameters.  Substituting for δ, the consistent estimator in (22) becomes  
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Calculation of (23) is the second step in Deaton’s method.  In the first step, the variables 
that are necessary to form the consistent estimator in (23) are computed.  In (18), the 
price variables vary by cluster but do not vary by household.  Hence, even though they 
are unobserved, they can be merged with the cluster fixed effect fc and (18) can be 
estimated by a fixed effects formulation to obtain consistent estimates of βk and γk, which 
are used to form  kc y .   Also let e  be the residuals from this regression.  Similarly,  khc
  17 (19) can also be estimated by a fixed effects model to obtain residuals n .   Then 
is consistently estimated by   and   is 
consistently estimated by  where T is the total number of 
observations, c is the number of clusters (or fixed effects) and l is the number of the other 
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  Even if unit values accurately measured prices, households may pay different 
prices depending on the quality of the commodity.  Because of quality preference, unit 
values are typically higher for richer households.  A change in unit value could therefore 
be due either to a change in price or a change in quality.  If quality preference were 
ignored, demand elasticities would tend to be upwardly biased.  Deaton proposes a 
quality correction that removes the bias.  However, we do not apply any quality 
correction because the resulting bias is likely to be small for two reasons.  First, Deaton 
reported small quality elasticities for cereals.  We find this in our data too especially for 
coarse cereals.  Secondly, quality preference is absent in the case of the subsidised 
commodities where the government supplies one quality of grain.   
 
5.  Results 
We now turn to a numerical evaluation of the welfare change due to a shift of a 
rupee of subsidy from rice and wheat to coarse cereals.  As noted earlier, our analysis 
throws light on the direction rather than the magnitude of welfare change.  For this 
reason, it is convenient to rewrite (7) as   




































In order to compute (24), we must specify the current subsidy rate to different 
commodities, i.e., ri.  This involves specification of pi and ci.  Since coarse cereals are not 
currently subsidised, r3 = 0.    For PDS rice and wheat, pi is the price at which 
government sells grain to consumers.  From the data, we calculate pi as the median price 
paid by different households.  We used two alternative specifications to approximate ci, 
the cost of supplying a unit of subsidised commodity.  In the first specification, we use 
the figures of economic costs incurred by the Food Corporation of India in supplying 
foodgrains to the PDS.
5   In the second specification, we let ci be the average price paid 
by the poorest 10% of the population.  The assumption here is that the quality of rice and 
wheat supplied through the PDS is similar to that purchased from the market by the 
poorest decile of households.  The results of this exercise are reported in Table 4.  
Subsidy rate 1 is based on the economic cost of the Food Corporation of India.  Subsidy 
rate 2 is based on prices paid by the poorest 10% of the population.  As can be seen, 
subsidy rates are substantially higher in Andhra Pradesh than in Maharashtra.     
Tables 5 and 6 report the socially representative budget shares for the two states, 
i.e.,  , for subsidised rice, subsidised wheat and coarse cereals for different values of ε.  
Recall,   is the household average of the product of budget share and welfare weight.  
In the tables, the welfare weights have been rescaled such that   sums to unity across 







                                                            
5 Estimates of these costs are provided in the annual Economic Survey published by the government of 
India.  Our figures are from the Economic Survey (1999-2000).  
  19 socially weighted share of coarse cereals.  Exactly opposite is the case with rice and 
wheat in all regions except for rice in urban Andhra Pradesh.   But for this exception, 
these patterns suggest that greater is ε, greater is likely to be the welfare gain from the 
policy reform.  These tables also reveal the socially representative budget shares in 
Maharashtra to be much higher than in Andhra Pradesh.  This suggests that policy reform 
is more likely to produce gains in Maharashtra than in Andhra Pradesh.   
  The welfare gains also depend on the extent to which policy reform subsidises 
coarse cereals.  This is shown in Table 7 for both states, by region and for the high and 
low subsidy regime.  Since   is a function of demand responses, the precision with 
which it is estimated depends on how well the demand parameters are estimated.  The 
table therefore also reports bootstrapped standard errors.  The estimates for Andhra 
Pradesh are very imprecise and the data is uninformative about the magnitude of 
.  This is probably due to the dominance of rice in cereal budgets across 
households and regions (averaging between 75 to 90%) unlike consumption patterns in 
Maharashtra that are more diversified and variable.   
1 3 / dr dr
1 3 / dr dr
 Table 8 presents the computations of welfare change for Maharashtra, for the 
rural and urban areas, for the different specifications of subsidy rates and for different 
values of the inequality aversion parameter ε.  The figures in parantheses are 
bootstrapped standard errors. The results are remarkably robust – social welfare goes up 
unambiguously if the PDS prices of rice and wheat are increased so as to keep the rates of 
subsidy constant while the price of coarse cereals is decreased so as to keep the total 
subsidy bill constant.  This is true even when the social welfare function is simply the 
unweighted sum of individual utilities.  Of course, the magnitude of increase in social 
  20 welfare is higher if the social welfare function exhibits inequality aversion – that is if the 
social welfare function attaches greater weight to the utilities of poorer households. Since 
coarse cereals account for a larger fraction of the budgets of the poorer households, the 
decrease in the price of coarse cereals has a correspondingly larger beneficial impact on 
the utilities of poorer households.   
We also prepared a similar table for Andhra Pradesh but do not present it here 
because the welfare changes are so badly estimated that none of them were significantly 
different from zero.  This happens because   is poorly estimated.   As noted 
earlier, in Andhra Pradesh, the socially representative budget share is much higher for 
subsidised rice than for coarse cereals.  This suggests that a policy reform that transfers 
subsidies from rice to coarse cereals is less likely to produce gains even for the poor.  To 
confirm this, we computed the change in welfare due to the policy reform for various 
values of  .  The results are shown in Table 9.  As can be seen, the policy reform 
of the kind we are considering produces welfare gains only if it results in large decreases 
in the price of coarse cereals.  This is especially so in urban areas.  For small to moderate 
price decreases, the gains are insufficient to overcome the losses from higher rice prices.   
1 3 / dr dr
1 3 / dr dr
 
6. Conclusions 
  In this paper, we used tax reform analysis to evaluate the gains from self-targeted 
interventions in the design of food subsidies.   For empirical analysis, we considered the 
Indian states of Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra.  In both these states, significant 
numbers of the nontargeted population received subsidies.  At the same time, 
consumption patterns revealed coarse cereals (which are not subsidised) to be more 
  21 important for the poor, in absolute and relative terms, than for the nonpoor.  If we 
considered a social welfare function that weighted the consumption of the poor more 
strongly than of the nonpoor, then would a shift of subsidy from rice and wheat to an 
inferior commodity such as coarse cereals improve welfare? 
  Our results support such a reform in Maharashtra but do not endorse it for Andhra 
Pradesh.  Our results are divergent even though (a) the food subsidy systems are 
comparable between the two states in their coverage of the nonpoor and (b) coarse cereals 
are an inferior commodity group in both states.  Therefore, self-targeting by subsidizing 
an inferior commodity does not always lead to higher welfare even when the welfare 
function is weighted in favour of the poor.  This happens because the welfare gains also 
depend on the  shares of the subsidised commodities and of coarse cereals in the budgets 
of the poor.  In Maharashtra, poor households consume significant amount of coarse 
cereals and correspondingly smaller quantities of superior qualities of food grains.  
Hence, they benefit from the relative price change in favour of coarse cereals.  In 
contrast, poor households in Andhra Pradesh lose from such “local” changes because of 
their considerable consumption of subsidised rice.   
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Poorest 40%  .77  .4  4.04  2.4 
Middle  30%  .53 .24 2.85  .77 
Richest 30%  .48  .2  2.2  .7 
 
Source:  Our calculations from the NSS survey of consumption expenditures: 1993/94 
 
  24 Table 2: Average Household Budget Shares By Decile Groups in Andhra Pradesh 
 
 Rural  Rural  Urban  Urban 
Decile 
Group 
Subsidised Rice  Coarse Cereals  Subsidised Rice  Coarse Cereals 
1 8  %  2.4%  5.8%  1.1% 
2 6.6%  1.3%  3.9%  0.64% 
3 5.7%  .95%  3.4%  0.44% 
4 5.1%  .82%  2.7%  0.29% 
5 4.5%  .67%  2.3%  0.53% 
6 4.4%  .83%  1.7%  0.18% 
7 3.7%  .53%  1.3%  0.17% 
8 2.7%  .55%  0.76%  0.19% 
9 1.8%  .35%  0.28%  0.07% 
10 1.1%  .2%  0.24%  0.04% 
Overall 4.4%  .86%  2.3%  0.37% 
  
Source:  Our calculations from the NSS survey of consumption expenditures: 1993/94 
Table 3: Average Household Budget Shares By Decile Groups in Maharashtra 
 















1 1.4% 1.4%  10.4%  1.6% 1.2%  7.9% 
2 1.7% 1.4%  7.2%  1.7% 1.2%  3.3% 
3 1.6% 1.5%  6.6%  1.6% 1.0%  3.1% 
4 1.3% 1.2%  6.3%  1.4% 0.7%  1.6% 
5 1.4% 1.1%  4.2%  1.1% 0.6%  1% 
6  1.6%  1.3% 4.2% 0.99%  0.5% 0.8% 
7 1.1% 1.1%  3.4%  0.86%  0.36%  0.42% 
8 1.3% 0.95%  2.3%  0.5% 0.28%  0.31% 
9 1.2% 0.8%  2.1%  0.45%  0.22%  0.37% 
10 0.5%  0.4%  1.0%  0.18% 0.07%  0.1% 
Overall  1.1% 1.0%  4.2%  1.1% 0.65%  2% 
 
Source:  Our calculations from the NSS survey of consumption expenditures: 1993/94 
 
  25 Table 4:  Subsidy Rates on Rice and Wheat 
 p i (Median 




Cost of the 
FCI per Kg) 
ci (Average 
price of Kg 
of market 








6 6.65  7.4  10%  19% 
Wheat 
(Maharashtra) 
4.25 5.32  6.15  20%  31% 
Rice (Andhra 
Pradesh) 




3.6 5.32  8.12  32%  56% 
 
 
Table 5: Socially Representative Budget Shares: Maharashtra 













ε = 0  .21    .18   .61    .33    .19    .47  
ε = -1  .19    .16   .65    .28     .17    .55  
ε = -1.5  .18    .15    .67    .25     .16    .59   
ε = -2  .17 .14 .69 .22  .15 .63 
4 
Table 6: Socially Representative Budget Shares: Andhra Pradesh 













ε = 0  .78  .017   .20    .67  .20    .12  
ε = -1  .78    .01  .21    .72     .15    .13  
ε = -1.5  .77    .008    .22    .73     .13    .14   
ε = -2  .76 .007  .23 .75  .11 .14 
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Table 7: Subsidy Rate Change in Coarse Cereals Due to a Marginal Decrease in 
Subsidy Rates on Rice and Wheat 
 






















Note:  Standard errors are in parantheses. 
                                                    
Table 8: Estimated Welfare Effects - Maharashtra 
Sector  ε    DW (Subsidy Rate 1)  DW (Subsidy Rate 2) 

































Note:  Standard errors are in parantheses 
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Table 9:  Welfare Effects in Andhra Pradesh 
 
1 3 /dr dr   AP Urban (ε=1)  AP Urban (ε=2)  AP Rural (ε=1)  AP urban (ε=2) 
-1  1.49 1.48 1.3  1.26 
-5  .94 .92 .36 .3 
-10 .26 .22 -.75  -.85 
-15  -.42 -.47 -1.85  -2 
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